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The period from 1650 to 1'750 was not one characterised by major institutional 
innovation in the government of London, let alone revolutionary structural change. 
The contrast between the centralised and well-organised government of the City 
and the atomised and somewhat improvised governmental institutions of the rest 
of the metropolis was as striking at the end of the period as it was at the beginning. 
Though the constitutional framework of the corporation by which the City was 
governed was undoubtedly the focus of considerable contest and controversy, there 
was in the event little lasting change. Nor was there real change to the situation 
outside the City, where responsibility for local government was shared by parish 
vestries and justices. However serious the problems that this structure, or lack of 
structure, entailed, they had not yet generated enough urgency or concern to lead 
to significant reform. 
However, structural forms are not the only possible locus of change. The nature 
of government changed and the power relations between national and local 
government shifted, as did the scope and competence of administrative activity. 
Many of the characteristic features of today's London's governance emerged or 
became significant in this period and many aspects of the modern metropolitan 
experience were formed then.' 
Themes 
This paper covers the period stretching from the Civil War of the 1640s, when popular 
feeling in London sided decisively with Parliament against the Crown, to the 1740s, 
when, though the capital nourished some Jacobite yearnings, the City establishment 
effectively backed the Westminster government. The period embraces such episodes 
on the national stage as the inception and collapse of the republic and the 
Cromwellian protectorate, the Glorious Revolution of 1 688-9, the effective 
establishment of the Hanoverian dynasty, and Britain's commitment to a series of 
major foreign and colonial wars and the building of an empire. It saw the capital's 
population grow by half or two-thirds again, from some 400,000 in 1650 to 675,000 
in 1'750.* It also saw this population decimated by the last great epidemic of the 
European age of plague in 1665, when 69,000 people died. London made a 
remarkable recovery from this and from the Great Fire of 1666 that devastated the 
core of the walled city, centre of commerce and trade. The Fire resulted in a 
rebuilding of the city to new standards of space and amenity, but it may also have 
encouraged the westward spread of retail, entertainment and service industries. Over 
the period 1650 to 1'750 London sprawled more widely, to east and west, and north 
and south of the river and by the time ofJohn Rocque's map of 1746, the continuously 
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built-up area stretched from Hyde Park Corner in the west to Whitechapel and 
Wapping in the east, and from Clerkenwell and Hoxton in the north to Smith Square 
and the start of the Old Kent Road in the south. The centre of gravity shifted 
westwards, into the West End with whose outlines we are all familiar."n physical terms, 
modem Londoners would recognise much of the London of 1'750, at least in street 
names and street pattern, as well as building type - the Georgian town-house or 
terrace and its descendants - if not in presently surviving  building^.^ We would 
recognise many characteristics of mid-eighteenth century Londoners too: the growth 
of a middling class, a consuming society, employed largely in service industries and 
the professions, enjoying an increasing degree of domestic comfort and sharing in a 
public culture of entertainment and sociability. 
It was a century of immense political, economic, social and cultural change, but 
in the context of London's government there were three main developments on 
which this paper will focus. The overarching one is the politicisation of London 
government, both as an issue and as a process: that is, the politicisation of the 
process of choosing or  identifying the governors of London, and the increased 
significance in national party-politics of the stance of London's governors. 
Underpinning this, and enhancing its importance, is the financial revolution and 
the invention of 'the City' as we understand the term. The period saw the 
foundation of the Bank of England and of a new kind of government finance. 
Relations between the government at Westminster and the City in this sense were 
of paramount importance, but were complicated by the variable extent of overlap 
between the great figures of the financial City and the leaders of the City as a 
corporate local-government authority. Thirdly, I would argue that local government 
in the rest of London, while still fairly ad hoe in its institutions, began to respond 
to heightened expectations of the quality of life in the metropolis. In the process, 
however, it encountered a number of new problems, notably that of accountability. 
The politicisation of London government 
English politics were polarised by the Civil War and the conflicts of the 1640s and 
1650s. There were lasting and bitter antagonisms in post-Restoration England, and 
no shortage of political issues to keep them alive. The Restoration settlement settled 
very little in that key matters such as the royal prerogative, parliamentary authority, 
and religious toleration remained controversial. It would be misleading to imply 
that roundhead and cavalier simply mutated into the Whig and Tory of the later 
seven teen th and eighteenth centuries: the situation was much more fluid. 'Court' 
and 'Country' allegiances, the opposition between the landed and the so-called 
'monied' interests, and simple rivalry between those who were in power and those 
who were excluded from it, meant that identities and affinities were often shifting. 
There is also the important fact that the Whig party moved from oppositionist, 
libertarian criticism of the regime under Charles I1 and James I1 to being the party 
of power and the author of notoriously anti-libertarian measures in the early 
eighteenth century, while the Tory party gained popular backing especially for its 
high-church position. Religious affiliation formed an intrinsic part of ideological 
and political identities from the Civil War and well into the eighteenth century. 
Differing attitudes towards toleration or conformity caused sharp divisions between 
individuals and groups. There was a significant overlap between Whiggism and 
Dissent and the monied interest, and a similar overlap between Anglicanism and 
Toryism, but London contained multitudes and its political temper defies simple 
or consistent characterisation. At different moments its rulers, its representatives, 
and the popular voice - which were rarely identical - were parliamentarian, 
monarchist, independent, presbyterian, Anglican, anti-Catholic, pro-Hanoverian, 
or mildly Jacobite. 
The Civil War had a long legacy in London. The decisive commitment of the 
City and its resources to the parliamentarian side came about in a combination of 
direct popular action (including mass petitioning of Parliament), and constitutional 
upheaval, as a more radical group of citizens took power in Common Council and 
overthrew the cautious conservatism of the aldermanic elite.5 Both popular protest 
and political division within the governing class were to characterise London politics 
over the next century. The development of adversarial politics also led to 
constitutional change and experiment in the attempt to consolidate power in the 
hands of a particular group; the fact that there appeared to be political polarisation 
between the Court of Aldermen and Common Council focused constitutional 
contest on the issue of their relative powers and independence. During the Civil 
War years, Common Council established itself as a the principal authority in the 
City, largely independent of aldermanic control. Although this position was lost at 
the Restoration, it remained a significant issue." What also came to the fore in the 
Restoration years was the importance of parliamentary contests in the City, which 
returned four M.P.s. The outcome of both local and parliamentary elections could 
be influenced, or even decided, by revising definitions of the civic franchise and 
by the intervention of mayoraI or aldermanic authority, so several apparently internal 
constitutional issues also had an outward impact.' 
It is thus impossible to separate London politics from national politics under 
Charles I1 and his successors. Not every manifestation of this can be illustrated, but 
one can for example point to the important role that a parliamentarian/republican 
faction in London, backed by strong popular anti-Catholic feeling, played in the 
attempt to exclude the Catholic duke of York from the succession to the throne 
in 1679-81. London's M.P.s were vociferous supporters of the Exclusion Bill, and 
the City authorities themselves promoted several massive petitions; Charles's decision 
to hold the third of three shortlived parliaments called during the crisis at Oxford 
was undoubtedly motivated by fears of the likely intervention of the London crowd. 
The Exclusion Crisis was also inextricably enmeshed in City politics: shrieval elections, 
for example, had wide implications, since sheriffs impanelled juries and so could 
affect the outcome of criminal trials with a political bearing.Wter the Exclusion 
Crisis, the City and the crown went head-to-head again over the City's charter, which 
the king suspended in 1683, imposing direct rule from Westminster. In this he 
was motivated possibly by a desire for revenge and certainly by the wish to ensure 
that London's internal government was in the hands of 'safe men' and that London's 
M.P.s would be chosen by an electorate purged of his opponents.' 
London's support was, quite simply, crucial to the success of the revolution of 
1688-9. As in the 1640s, this was due to a combination of, on the one hand, popular 
action, including parliamentary petitioning, and, on the other, the participation 
of an organised and articulate party of aldermen, common councillors, and 
subsequently M.P.s in pushing forward a political solution. Equally, once the dust 
had settled, the internal governance of the City was a pressing issue. James I1 had 
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restored the suspended charter but, as the act of a dethroned monarch, this 
needed to be further secured. A Whig-dominated Court of Aldermen drafted a 
constitutional bill that would have returned the balance of authority to Common 
Council and the representatives of the City electorate, though - so quickly did 
political fortunes change - a more conservative bill was in fact enacted. But there 
had still been a signal victory for the Whig interest in both national and City politics.I0 
The Invention of 'the City' 
Party-politics and constitutional issues were not the only areas affected by the 
Revolution of 1688-9. It had important financial aspects, including the invention 
of 'the City' as we understand the term. 'Revolutionary finance' or 'the financial 
revolution' are terms used by historians to denote the collaboration of moneyed 
interests in London and the government at Westminster which greatly enhanced 
the power of the state." The role of London and Londoners in lending financial 
support - credit and credibility - to governments had been a significant feature 
of their relationship over the cen turies.I2 The Civil War had demonstrated how 
much could be extracted from the City when it was actively committed to supporting 
the government at Westminster; but the vicissitudes of party strife and monarchical 
government in the Restoration years had also shown up the precariousness of this 
relationship. The wealth of late seventeenth-century London was enormous, but 
for both technical and political reasons it could not be harnessed to the realisation 
of government policy. Continuing suspicion about the king's internal and foreign 
policies certainly played a part, especially since a significant number of wealthy 
London merchants belonged to the dissenting interest.IY London's support for a 
Williamite solution in 1688-9, therefore, was exceptionally important. 
After the revolution, the securing of the constitution and the firm commitment 
of the Whig interest in the City to William 111's government and its policies opened 
the way to a real and lasting collaboration. This relationship was not a simple or 
uncontested development, but within a few years it had led to the establishment 
of the Bank of England and the creation of the national debt, and to a future in 
which national government could fund its activities through the financial market 
and public credit. With these resources at its command, William's government was 
able to embark on a costly European war on a scale formerly inconceivable. These 
developments established a close association between successive Whig ministries and 
the moneyed interest in the city. The Whigs became identified as the party of power 
and privilege, and could also be seen as in thrall to Dissent: the subscribers to and 
directors of the Bank of England and the East India Company certainly included 
numerous well-known Whigs and Dissenters, including some who also served as 
aldermen in the period. The partisan nature of this collaboration, however, and 
the huge scale of this novel enterprise, certainly gave rise to anxiety and to attempts 
to divert o r  re-form the direction that such matters were taking. The dominant 
position of the Bank of England was resented in many quarters, as were its failings, 
and alternative schemes to fund or  support government debt were floated.I4 
It was in this context - of high taxation to finance European war from the 1690s 
onwards, and a Dissenting/Whig hegemony in the city - that the Tories took on 
the mantle of defenders of the popular interest or at least of the small tradesman. 
They were also able to tap into disgruntled Anglicanism, the ever present 
xenophobia of some Londoners, and latent support for the Jacobite cause. The 
rioting at the end of the trial for sedition of the inflammatory preacher Dr 
Sacheverell in 1'710 graphically demonstrated the strength of popular Anglicanism 
and hostility to the long ascendancy of the Whig interest.'Significantly, 1710-1 1 
was also the moment when the government came closest to 'losing the City', in 
the sense of losing the financial backing of the moneyed interest in the city. But - 
ironically to modern eyes - this was a Tory ministry. Queen Anne was warned by 
the Bank that changing her  ministers would 'affect all the public credit'; the 
subsequent Tory victory at the polls brought on a crisis of credit, only resolved by 
hard negotiations between the Bank and the Treasury, and leading, among other 
things, to the floating of the South Sea Company in 1'711 to take up further 
government debt."jThe Company's scheme of 1719, which became the Bubble 
that burst, disastrously, in 1720, was a dubious but not overtly fraudulent proposal 
to redeem government credit after years of high war expenditure. In the event, 
though, it proved a disaster for many smaller investors but left the Whig oligarchy 
in the City and at Westminster strengthened but even more unpopular." 
The Tory leadership had lost heavily in 1714-15, but popular Toryism remained 
a feature of London politics and certainly influenced the attitude of Walpole's 
ministry, engaging it, inevitably, in defence of the Whig and moneyed interest. The 
perception that Common Council was dominated by Tories, or  at least by anti- 
ministry feeling, led to Walpole's City Elections Act of 1725, which in the name of 
beneficial reform redrew the City franchise and asserted the aldermanic veto over 
Common Council's actions. The balance of power between aldermen and Common 
Council had been a recurrent theme in London politics since the 1640s and 
although this act only remained in force until 1746, it demonstrates yet again how 
London's government and constitution could be a pawn in manoeuvrings on the 
national political board.18 In the longer term, however, the Corporation and the 
financial City began to diverge: the great merchants and financiers no longer took 
up public office, as they had in the past, and the financial institutions dealt directly 
with national government rather than through the corporation. The national 
significance of the politics of City government declined, though it could reappear 
as a focus of political attention at moments of crisis. 
The Rest of London 
What of the rest of London? It is not inappropriate that the politics of City 
government has dominated this discussion, since that was arguably the most 
significant arena of constitutional debate and development. But at the same time, 
most Londoners were not directly party to these dissentions. Well over half the 
population of London at the start of the period, and at least three-quarters or even 
four-fifths by the end, lived outside the area of jurisdiction of the Corporation. 
While Londoners in general might participate in political activity, especially in 
Parliamentary elections in the Westminster constituency, which had a very wide 
franchise, and in crowd action on numerous occasions, there was little connection 
between party politics and the reality of local government in the rest of the 
metropolis. Focusing on the City is relevant here as well, however, since it does 
seem likely that the factious and contested condition of City politics, and the City's 
significance to the Westminster government of the day, helped to postpone 
consideration of London's government as a whole. If the government - whether 
the Stuart monarchy or  the Whig ministerial oligarchy - believed that popular 
political attitudes in London were essentially oppositionist and critical (which on 
the whole they were) then there was little incentive to reform or  democratise 
London's local government. This is not necessarily to say that national government 
conspired to stifle real pressure for change, but in the existing circumstances 
significant reform was unlikely. 
The rest of London, therefore, had to make the best of its existing institutions. 
Both inside and outside the city, a considerable degree of authority lay in the hands 
of the parishes - tiny units of a few hundred houses within the walls, huge areas 
of densely-built development outside the city. In both cases, the parishes came 
under some superior authority, either the wardmotes and legislative councils of 
the City, or the justices of the peace for Middlesex and Surrey, who often exercised 
significant control.l"he alliance of parishes and J.P.s, institutions of fundamentally 
different origin, reflects the tendency of institutional evolution to co-opt useful 
structures and adapt them to changing ends. And indeed, many of the issues with 
which local government was confronted had both moral/religious and legal 
dimensions. The problem of poverty, for example, was addressed partly by raising 
and distributing monetary relief, and partly by disciplinary and punitive measures, 
but also by agitation for moral reform and the reformation of manners. In 
contemporary Paris the creation of a Lieutenant of Police, and the large-scale 
enclosure or institutionalisation of the poor, embodied both these demands and a 
means of solving them; in London, they had to be met by a much more ad hoc 
series of measures, empowerments, and expedients. In practice this reaffirmed the 
dependence of local authorities on the central state: in order to satisfy new needs, 
existing i~istitutions needed new powers which could only be granted by the state.20 
Conclusion 
How effective was local government in later seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
London? Certainly, major problems remained, but by the end of the period there 
had been progress in several areas. One of these was the beginnings of 
rationalisation of the parochial network to reflect the growth and shift of 
population. New parishes were created west of the City and south of the river in 
the later seventeenth century; more, both west and east, under the Fifty New 
Churches Act of 1711 (itself a product of the then Tory government's concern with 
the Church of England's loss of ground to Dissent in the capital)." Creating new 
parishes had both religious and welfare dimensions, and though the effectiveness 
of the measure depended on the local personnel, it did at least offer the chance 
of an improved local context in which problems could be addressed. The period 
saw an increasing demand for effective local government, as expectations of safety 
and comfort rose. These expectations entailed the maintenance of order, protection 
for individuals and property, increased environmental amenity, and the control of 
poverty and the poor. The impression is that demands were growing stronger and 
more articulate in the first half of the eighteenth century, and that the midpoint 
of the century saw a critical advance on several fronts - lighting, paving, police, 
care of the poor. Because of the fragmentation of authority these advances were 
mostly piecemeal and local, usually under powers granted by the central state but 
sometimes the result of private initiative and charity. The City obtained a Lighting 
Act in 1736, Spitalfields in 1738; Westminster got a Paving Act in 1762, and other 
parishes followed. The Bow Street police office was set up  in 1749, and the 
Foundling Hospital in 1 745.22 
Neither the parishes nor the benches of justices were democratic institutions; 
both showed some strain under their new powers and responsibilities. A third or 
more of the larger parish vestries were, or became, closed o r  select vestries, 
restricting administrative and executive decision-making to a small and often self- 
perpetuating group of ratepayers. Arguably, this could make for better, more 
efficient administration, and it certainly helped to keep party political contest at 
the local level to a minimum, but it also concentrated the profits and patronage 
of the office in a few hands and could encourage venality or corruption, as the 
complaints of excluded parishioners in certain cases make clear. Vestries were 
sometimes literally, and often in a more general sense, unaccountable. As local 
government became more active, in response to rising demands, and the sums of 
money it handled increased, so the problem grew, and not only in relation to closed 
vestries. One notorious feature was the manipulation of rating assessments, to favour 
friends and associates and also, at times, to include or exclude voters. Similarly, 
the benches of justices were made up by nomination and co-option, and the off~ce 
was liable to subversion. In George Rude's words 'the fact remains that the 
promotion of men of humble means to unpaid positions of authority, often 
involving considerable out-of-pocket expenses, opened the way for the unsavoury 
scandal of the "trading justice" ', who depended for his remuneration on the 
quantity of legal business he  transacted.'Vhere were certainly active, public- 
spirited, reforming justices, just as there must have been conscientious, responsible, 
disinterested vestrymen, but the misdeeds of their opposites have attracted more 
attention." Corruption of an explicit kind did become a feature of London's public 
life in this period: though earlier practices had undoubtedly served the interests 
of the 'better', senior, wealthier part of society, and disfranchised the rest, they 
had probably not been overtly corrupt or corruptible in the same way. But as later 
developments have shown, a rewards system is one incentive to participation in 
public life; in the absence of an ethos of professionalised public sellice it is hard 
to see how local administrations could otherwise have been filled. 
Individual contributions to a sequence of papers that deals with centuries of 
chronology and development can hardly offer universal conclusions. However, each 
one needs to make a point, to highlight the crucial events or developments in its 
allotted span, before the next paper presents a different perspective. In the period 
1650 to 1'750, then, London government changed, not so much in structure or 
institutions, but in character: it became highly politicised, entangled with national 
political issues, not least because of the development of revolutionary finance. 
Expectations of what both the state and local government could deliver rose; 
London's various authorities responded, often inventively and constructively, within 
their limitations, but new problems, notably that of accountability, emerged. 
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